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Abstract. Italian agro-food cooperatives are involved in mergers, acquisition and alliances processes, that require a
renovating model of membership management. Wine cooperatives are particularly dynamic in this context. The aim
of the research is to identify new integration patterns between the cooperative and its members, starting from the
analysis of the members’ structural and strategic choices. The research has been conducted in a wine cooperative of
Veneto Region. Five elements of differentiation have been discussed and moving from five clusters of members, a
linear regression model has been applied. The actual mechanism of patronage return does not comprehend the
complexity of membership, but it confirms the hypothesis that the cooperative should follow differerentiated
integration strategies for the diverse typologies of members. The large structural, strategic, social-demographic and
cultural heterogeneity of the members (especially in the big cooperatives) suggests to foresee different patterns in
term of development projects, in order to propose diverse solutions for new investment initiatives and the quality
improvement of deliveries, ensuring a more widespread satisfaction of stakeholders’ expectations.
Keywords: Wine Cooperative, Cooperative Nexus, Patronage Return, Membership Integration.
1. Introduction
The development of agricultural cooperative literature from the 1990’s has been summarized by Cook et
al.
[1]. Before, Staatz
[2] identified three theoretical approaches for the agricultural cooperative in the
research conducted from the 1950’s until the late 1980’s (cooperative as a form of vertical integration, as
an independent firm and as a coalition of firms). Cook et al.
[1] highlight that from the 1990’s the
agricultural cooperative studies are influenced by the new developments in economic theories and
decision models. Three approaches of analysis have been identified. The first concerns the revision of the
approach of the cooperative as a firm with reference to the agricultural marketing cooperatives
[3-5]. The
second approach, the cooperative as a coalitio n, emphasizes the dy namics of coordination among the
members and the bargaining power of their various coalitions about the distribution of benefits. This
involves other theoretical issues, such as the design of bylaw, the planning horizon of decision-makers,
the pricing scheme and the investment decision
[6-12]. The third approach, the cooperative as a nexus of
contracts, underlines the contractual relationship among the stakeholders, by utilizing the theories of
agency, transaction costs and property rights. The main theoretical advances regard cooperative control,
organisational design, governance choices and investment decisions
[13-16].
According to the intensification of the strategic competition, nowadays the scientific debate topics
concern aggregation and alliance strategies and push to elaborate a new cooperative model, in order to
enhance the relationship with the stakeholders, and particularly the members.
Some recent researches explain the most important factors that motivate mergers, acquisitions, joint
ventures and strategic alliances, such as the decreasing number of farms, increased costs and the
industrialisation of agriculture
[17,18]. The key factors that contribute to the success of these operations
might be related to interpersonal actions: the level of trust and commitment of the members, the degree of
cooperative communication and team work skills of the management. In particular, Ruffio et al.
[18]
observe that the French agricultural cooperatives are creating a complex partnership network that causes
the need for organizational and institutional coherence and where the management plays an important role
in the activation. This process requires the redefinition of the boundaries of the cooperative and its link
with the environment. Traditionally based on a political cohesion, the cooperative must elaborate a new
economic and strategic project. The definition of this is not so clear. The causes can be identified in the
weakness of the leaders authority, the potential disengagement of the members, the increasing distance3
between the board of directors, the management and the members, the concentration of the power in the
hands of a few people and the non-transparent circulation of information
[19].
Regarding these topics, a recent study of Östenberg and Nilsson
[20] investigates the importance of the
socio-economical and psychological attributes of the members in the agricultural cooperatives. These
authors identify some critical aspects of the members’ behaviour and their degree of participation in the
cooperative. In particular, they point out four members’ characteristics: the evaluation of the profitability
in farm operations, the age, the experience as members of the cooperative board and the perception in the
control of the cooperative. These characteristics make the members’ control increasingly problematic,
especially in large cooperatives with diversified business activities and with large and heterogeneous
membership.
These results involve a new socio-psychological perspective. According to Lambert
[21], the social identity
is a b asic element o f the coo perativ e sy stem and, in p articular, o f  the relatio ns hip that the bo ard of
d i r e c t o r s  m a i n t a i n s  w i t h  t h e  m e m b e r s .  B y  p u r s u i n g  g o a l s  a n d  s t r a t e g i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  t y p e s  o f
enterprises, the cooperative reveals its own objectives and that can create a distance from the members
(for example, because of the need of many French and Italian cooperatives to differentiate the product
portfolio). Lambert
[23] takes the example of some French wineries. In different usual aspects of the
cooperative life (entrance, power distribution, participation in the governance, relationship of the
members with the board of directors and the management) the cooperative management elaborates
coercive measures, but at the same time the flexibility of application to ensure freedom and members’
conviction is a necessary strength.
Biarnès and Touzard
[22] focus on the differentiated remuneration for the grapes in the French cooperatives
of the Languedoc region. This empirical study explains that the change in the grape remuneration
mechanism is a real process of organisational innovation, difficult to implement and based on a formal
device. It can be imperfect, and therefore it requires interpersonal adjustments to complete it and to
contribute to its evolution. These authors identify some operational key elements: i) innovation in
marketing strategies; ii) stability, simplicity and flexibility of the standards; iii) application of greater
transparency; iv) activation of mechanisms of higher members’ accountability. A multidisciplinary
approach that joins economical, organisational, technical and sociological aspects is inevitable.
Regarding the Italian wine industry, cooperative integration has allowed not only the supply
concentration, against the production fragmentation of the viticultural phase, and the protection of the
bargaining power, but also the link with the market and the entrepreneurial growth of the members. In
Italy the wine cooperation system processes about 60% of the grape production. Also in Veneto Region
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(where the cooperative winery the object of the present research is located) the cooperatives maintain an
important position, in particular in the first phase of wine processing. There are forty cooperatives
involving more than 27,000 grape growers with a total vineyard area of 36,000 hectares.
The strategic approach of Veneto wine cooperatives tends to enlarge the boundaries of the traditional
model, predominately orientated in the technological and production capabilities. New targets of
coordination with other firms, development of projects, supply of original services to the members, and
renovation of the link with the territory are implemented
[23]. The pursuit of these new goals requires the
adaptation of the cooperative relationship, called “cooperative nexus”
[24], between the members, the board
of directors and the management. In particular, the growth of management responsibility and
specialization is an important factor to activate original initiatives, spread of information, and cultural
sharing among the members.
Recently, some of the largest wine cooperatives in Veneto have implemented new patterns of corporate
governance through operations of mergers and acquisitions and total or partial control of Invested Owned
Firms. However, a reactive approach was adopted regarding the necessity to increase the critical mass, to
reach economies of scale and scope, or to solve critical economic and financial situations. Furthermore,
1 Veneto is a north-east Italian region and is an high vocated wine area. There are more than 74,000 grape growers
and 70,000 hectares of vineyard. About 8 millions of hectolitres of wine are produced. The wine processing involves
also large companies with international reputation. Veneto is the first exporter region in Italy (28% of Italian export
value).4
the cooperatives are building better relationships with the members through the spread of quality
projects
2, the management of financial services, or the development of extension activities.
In a lot of cooperatives in Veneto, a review of the goals are elaborated, in order to enlarge the traditional
strategies (basic market targets and price leadership) through policies of product portfolio differentiation,
market segmentation, attention to value for money, and management of new channels. For these purposes,
four essential factors can be identified: the ability of the management to encourage innovation, the
cultural cohesion between the members and the cooperative, the improvement of the quality of members’
deliveries and the marketing strength
[25].
2. Objectives and methodology
The aim of this research is to identify new integration patterns between the cooperative and its members,
starting from the analysis of the members’ structural and strategic choices. This purpose originates from
the necessity of the cooperative to find new integration elements with the members. In fact, the cultural
and strategic gap between the members and the cooperative is increasing: the former are still small in
size, while the latter is becoming bigger and bigger through the implementation of aggregation strategies.
With this aim in mind, the specific goals are: a) to highlight the main differentiation factors of the
members and to identify homogenous members typologies; b) to determine the conditions that could set
up an innovative relationship between the cooperative and its members, which allow the cooperative to
use new opportunities of development and the members to increase management and control skills; c) to
explain the adopted grape supply evaluation mechanism and to hypothesize new solutions according to
the conditions in point b).
The research has been conducted taking a large dynamic wine cooperative from Veneto as a case-study. It
placed its database of about 1,800 members’ characteristics, vineyards and income at our disposal. The
choice has fallen on this cooperative because in recent years it has been particularly active in mergers,
marketing and relationship with members
3.
The analysis of information was realized in three phases.
The first one was carried out to explain the characteristics of the members by univariate analysis of the
database.
The second phase was designed to identify the homogeneous typologies of members, via the multivariate
statistical procedures of factor analysis and the k-means cluster analysis. The factor analysis was
conducted using the method of principal components and selecting a set of 15 variables that can explain
the characteristics of the vineyards and the grape supplies. The varimax method was used for factor
rotation. The cluster analysis was carried out to individuate the different typologies of members of the
cooperative winery from the scores associated to the extracted factors. The number of clusters was
determined on the basis of a comparative analysis among the matrix of Euclidean distances of alternative
clustering processes. The solution of five clusters has been choose.
The third part of the research proposed to develop a patronage return model which includes new elements
for the evaluation of the deliveries able to take account the members’ commitment in the improvement of
the grape quality. By considering the results achieved in the second phase of the research, a linear
multiple regression analysis has been conducted utilising the variables presented in Table 1.
2 Quality projects are voluntary initiatives of the wine cooperatives to encourage members to improve the quality of
the grapes. They come from a marketing plan to satisfy specific market targets with high range products. The
member’s participation is voluntary, even if the cooperatives favour the members with a higher quality propensity.
The participant are submitted to the technical rules of the “Quality Project”, they have to reduce the grape yield by
the monitoring of winery technicians, but in return they receive higher grapes payments than the other members.
3 Started at the beginning of the 1950’s, the winery processes about 700,000 tonnes of grapes in four manufacturing
plants, provided by 1,800 grape growers from three provinces of Veneto with 3,500 hectares of vineyards. Currently,
the turnover is almost 30 million euro. In the past, the strategic orientation focused on pricing strategy and the
prevalence of exclusive relationship with a few large processing and bottling companies. In the last decade, it was
enriched by the enhancement of production through policies of differentiation of product/channel/market. This
development took place via the achievement of numerous merger operations with cooperatives and the control of
Invested Owned Firms, specialized in successive stages of processing, packaging and marketing and able to increase
bargaining power and the penetration in retail trade.5
Table 1. Variables utilised in the regression analysis
Variable Mean
Dependent:
Grape value supply per hectare (€) 4,868.41
Explanatory:
Yield in grape (tonnes per hectare) 194.41
Share of vineyard on the hillside (%) 24.26
Share of vineyard enrolled in DOC registers (%) 33.54
Share of vineyard less than 10 years old (%) 28.24
Planting density (no. vines per hectare) 1,133.60
Share of mechanizable vineyard (%) 24.30
Share of white autochthonous grape supply (%) 29.34
Share of red international grape supply (%) 30.48
Share of “other grapes” supply (%) 27.23
Participation in quality initiatives (1/0) 93 (frequency)
The choice of using the supply value per hectare as a dependent variable comes from the diffusion to
evaluate the business profitability by referring to the cultivated area. Moreover, this variable has been
chosen also because the members involved in the Quality Project are remunerated according to the
cultivated area.
Regarding the independent variables, it is well-known that high yields per hectare are synonymous with
low quality, leading to the expectation of a negative sign associated with this variable. The quality of
delivered grapes should be directly proportional to localization on the hillside, enrolment in the DOC
registers, renewed vineyard, and involvement in quality initiatives, i.e. the participation in the Quality
Project, the production of organic grape and the delivery in plateaux. Therefore, if the cooperative would
encourage the production quality, the regression should lead to positive coefficients for these variables.
A different consideration should be done on the share of mechanized vineyard. On one side, the
mechanization is able to reduce the costs and production efforts, by making the viticultural practices more
efficient. On the other side, it is hardly practicable on the vocated hillside area and inefficient for small
farms. Given that the majority part of this cooperative land is on the plain and it aims at developing the
mechanization, the coefficient of this variable should be positive.
The varieties white autochthonous and red international and the “other grapes” have been introduced in
the regression because they are the most cultivated. If the quality was prized, the coefficient of the “other
grapes” should be less than the other two varieties or have a negative sign.
The application of this model allows to estimate the sensitivity of the grape supply value for the whole
population to the variation of the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, it does not take into account the
heterogeneity highlighted by the cluster analysis. By hypothesizing that the cooperative could foresee
different forms of incentives or penalties on the basis of the characteristics of the members and their
deliveries, the regression model has been applied for every cluster, aiming at evaluating its adherence and
proposing the most opportune interventions.6
3. Results
3.1. Segmentation of the cooperative membership
Table 2 highlights the critical aspects of the “grape growers - cooperative system”, reflecting the
problems of viticulture in Veneto: high fragmentation of the production system, high share of mature/old
age class, preponderance of vineyards located on the plain, low rate of vineyard renewal and
mechanization, scarce participation in quality projects. At the same time, there are interesting strengths:
the role of “family enterprise”, the innovation of the vineyard, where the land is passed on from father to
son, the differentiation capacity of the local grape varieties and the classification of origin (DOC,
Controlled Denomination of Origin, and IGT, Typical Geographical Indication).
Table 2. Main features of grape growers members, vineyards and grape supply
Grape growers members Vineyards Grape supply
Members’ characteristics
- male                              81.0%
- less than 40 years old     2.9%
- more than 60 years old 48.0%
Size of grape growers’business
- less than 1 ha                45.6%
- from 1 to 10 ha             52.8%
- more than 10 ha              1.6%
Legal form
- natural person               89.7%
Tenure status
- property                        75.0%
Location
- hillside                          24.3%
Trellis-training system
- pergola                          66.2%
- espalier                          20.5%
- mechanizable                24.3%
Grape variety
- white autochthonous     44.3%
- red international            32.5%
Age of vineyards
- less than 10 years          28.2%
- more than 20 years       49.6%
Enrolment in
- DOC registers               33.5%
- IGT lists                        34.3%
Main grape varieties
- Garganega                                42.1%
- Merlot                                      13.6%
- Cabernet Sauvignon                   7.3%
Main typologies of wine from
- white autochthonous varieties 29.3%
- red international varieties        23.6%
- white international varieties    13.4%
- red autochthonous varieties       1.9%
- “other grapes”*                        31.0%
Wines from
- quality initiatives                       4.9%
* Wine from “other grapes” means the production of undifferentiated table wine sold in bulk.
In the second phase, the factor analysis highlights the main factors that discriminate the behaviour of the
grape growers members. Five factors with eigenvalue greater than 1 have been extracted. They explain
73.7% of total variance. The analysis of factor scores shows the contribution of the selected variables in
the explanation of the members’ differentiation (Table 3).
The first factor is called Technological Choices. It points out that the first element of differentiation is the
interest in innovation through the espalier training system and the mechanization of viticultural
operations. This is a strategic option for the cooperative, especially in the organisation and rationalisation
of the harvest and the first grape processing. Moreover, the difficulties in finding skilled labour, the
working time in the vineyard and the related costs are reduced.
The second factor represents the Size. It highlights the propulsive strength of the largest members in
generating the grape supply value. The investment power in the vineyard is crucial for these members. It
is realized by higher planting density and the observance of cooperative guidelines, allowing a better
patronage return per hectare.
The third factor concerns the Renewal of the vineyard a n d  d i s c r i m i n a t e s  t h e  m e m b e r s  w h o  h a v e
modernized their vineyard in the last ten years from those who have not. This element is associated with
the choice of the variety. The innovative members have chosen the red and white international grape
varieties in relation to the winery business and the market demand. These members receive a better grape7
supply value per hectare. The owners of old vineyards maintain the white autochthonous varieties. The
cooperative should improve the differentiation policy for these members by introducing product
innovations in order to enhance the typical white wines of high perceived quality.
The fourth dimension is called Viticultural vocation and associates the vineyard located in hilly areas with
suitable choices for the typical denomination of origin wines and the participation in quality initiatives.
The fifth factor, Product Portfolio, highlights the two competitive orientations of the cooperative. The
first concerns the pre-eminent strategy of table wine production without classification of DOC and IGT.
While it was sold in bulk to large bottling companies in the past, now it is mostly packaged by the
controlled companies for the retail trade. The second approach implements the new differentiation policy
through the enlargement of the range of typical local white wines, the introduction of red and white
varietal wines, new packaging formats and the synergy between territorial and corporate brands.
Table 3. Matrix of rotated factor loadings
Variable Factor  1  Factor  2 Factor  3  Factor  4  Factor  5
Share of vineyard trained to espalier system (%) 0.890 -0.104 0.018 0.191 0.060
Share of vineyard trained to pergola system (%) -0.930 -0.071 -0.218 -0.114 -0.032
Share of mechanizable vineyard (%) 0.889 0.043 0.114 -0.038 0.010
Total grape supply value (€) -0.017 0.911 0.119 0.160 -0.021
Vineyard surface (ha) 0.018 0.907 0.034 0.164 0.047
Density of planting (no. vines per hectare) 0.018 0.732 0.121 -0.107 -0.005
Grape supply value per hectare (€) -0.264 0.435 0.444 0.104 -0.193
Share of vineyard less than 10 years (%) 0.173 0.214 0.828 0.150 0.060
Share of vineyard more than 20 years (%) -0.091 -0.237 -0.811 -0.223 -0.078
Share of international red grape supply (%) 0.413 -0.267 0.549 -0.140 0.252
Share of autochthonous white grape supply (%) -0.344 0.077 -0.565 0.038 0.610
Share of vineyard on the hillside (%) 0.030 -0.081 -0.024 0.839 0.074
Participation in quality initiatives (yes/no) 0.065 0.235 0.087 0.672 -0.085
Share of grape supply for DOC wines (%) 0.101 0.063 0.261 0.630 0.209
Share of “other grape” supply (%) -0.204 0.036 -0.219 -0.153 -0.899
Proportion of variance explained (%) 19.3 17.6 15.8 12.0 9.0
Cumulated variance explained (%) 19.3 36.9 52.7 64.7 73.7
As explained in section 2, from the factor scores associated to each subject the k-means cluster analysis
has allowed to identify five clusters of grape growers members.
The centroids of the clusters are indicated in Table 4, that permits their first characterisation. Cluster 1
highlights the negative role of Factor 3, but the positive contribution of product portfolio in relation to the
past technological choices. These last two aspects are negative for Cluster 2. Cluster 3 shows the interest
in the renewal of the vineyard. The characteristics of viticultural vocation mark both Cluster 4, which is
lacking in technological choices, and Cluster 5, which represents the largest businesses.
The presentation of univariate statistics for each of the five clusters in Table 5 allows the description of
the main characteristics of the members, the vineyards and the grape deliveries.8
Cluster 1 has the largest number of members, mostly elderly people with the smallest businesses and
reluctance to participate in quality initiatives. The vineyards are located on the plain and in the last ten
years these grape growers have initiated few renewal operations. Almost 90% of the vineyard surface is
more than 20 years old, characterised by the lowest planting density. However, there is a discrete share of
vineyard using the espalier training system (perhaps as result of past investments), which can allow the
mechanization of farming operations. This last aspect can be noted in the differentiation of the grape
supply characterized by the highest weight of white autochthonous varieties and a significant share of
IGT red international varieties. The participation in DOC production systems is the lowest. All these
structural and business characteristics have led this cluster to obtain the lowest patronage return per
hectare.
Table 4. Centres of clusters
Factor Cluster  1  Cluster  2  Cluster  3  Cluster  4  Cluster  5
1. Technological choices 0.498 -0.395 0.151 -0.531 0.403
2. Size -0.306 -0.116 0.594 -0.499 1.222
3. Renewal of the vineyard -0.730 -0.447 1.105 0.271 0.275
4. Viticultural vocation -0.350 -0.333 -0.579 0.875 2.657
5. Product portfolio 0.692 -1.207 0.160 0.500 -0.271
Also Cluster 2 aggregates a large number of members, elderly, with small business size, and reluctant to
participate in quality initiatives. As for Cluster 1, the vineyards are located on the plain and are not
renewed. The traditional pergola training system and the local white grape Garganega variety are
widespread. This cluster gives little importance to the qualitative enhancement of the grape productions,
as to the participation in DOC production systems. Despite the wideness of the IGT designation of the
vineyards, the crop yields are the highest and more than two thirds of the deliveries produce
undifferentiated medium-low quality wines without territorial indication. Thus this cluster receives a low
total patronage return, but a better remuneration per hectare than Cluster 1.
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 have some common elements. Cluster 1 could be called Warn out seniors. The
inactivity of these members does not allow to ensure consistent adjustments of the production choices
through the remuneration policies of the cooperative. For Cluster 2, called Opportunistic seniors, the
current mechanism of patronage return is not able to promote the improvement of the grape quality and to
penalize the opportunistic behaviours yet. For both clusters the socio-cultural characteristics and the
speculative attitude represent a significant deterrent to their evolution according to the strategy of the
cooperative, and to establish integration processes. Probably only for Cluster 1 there may be possibilities
of integration in the medium-long term, if the intergenerational transfer is ensured.
Cluster 3 is made up of the youngest members; their business size is higher than the previous clusters.
The vineyards are located in flat areas and they do not participate in quality initiatives. But these
members invest in the vineyard: two thirds of the surface has been renewed in the last ten years with a
high percentage of mechanized training systems and the highest average of planting density. This has
allowed to privilege the choice of international red and white grape varieties more than any other clusters
and to the detriment of local white varieties. The business choices have been focused on the vineyard
valorisation through the enrolment in IGT lists rather than in the DOC registers. Business size, high yields
and production choices allow to achieve higher patronage return per hectare than Cluster 1 and 2. This
cluster could be called Quantity focused. They are members that could potentially follow the quality
initiatives, but the cooperative has not defined a promotion policy for them yet. This has given way to
free rider conduct. In order to reduce this risk and favour the integration with the cooperative, the
propensity to innovation represents the most interesting business element to incentive.
Cluster 4 is a little smaller than the previous ones. The members are classified by mature/old age classes,
little business sizes, but marked interest in typicality.9












Members age (years) 62 62 54 58 51
Vineyard surface (ha) 1.1 1.4 3.1 1.5 5.4
Participants in quality initiatives (no.) 0 1 3 6 83
Vineyards
Share of the vineyards surface:
- in property (%) 82.0 85.2 75.6 82.6 75.7
- on the hillside (%) 12.5 7.7 3.3 72.1 89.6
- less than 10 years old (%) 5.9 8.4 66.6 31.0 59.5
- more than 20 years old (%) 89.4 84.7 21.5 50.6 22.6
- espalier-trained (%) 40.5 5.8 21.1 12.6 53.1
- pergola-trained (%) 58.5 91.7 53.3 85.3 38.2
- mechanizable (%) 38.7 7.0 38.1 7.2 30.0
Planting density (no. vines per hectare) 756 1,069 1,807 788 1,716
Share of the vineyards surface:
- registered in IGT lists (%) 81.5 68.7 63.4 34.7 21.8
- enrolled in DOC registers (%) 17.3 18.8 35.4 65.1 78.2
- cultivated by organic methods (%) 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.2 4.3
- of white autochthonous variety (%) 56.8 72.5 21.4 41.6 20.4
- of white international variety (%) 3.1 3.8 25.1 13.3 24.0
- of red international variety (%) 33.0 16.5 52.4 35.0 44.9
Grape supply
Grape supply value per member (€) 4,260.2 7,614.6 19,491.9 7,312.1 36,152.5
Grape supply value per hectare (€) 3,531.0 4,847.9 6,066.5 4,862.9 6,727.1
Yield in grape (tonnes per hectare) 16.5 26.0 24.4 17.0 12.3
Share of grape supply for:
- white autochthonous DOC wines (%) 4.4 1.4 2.0 18.0 10.1
- white autochthonous IGT wines (%) 44.0 23.3 13.2 17.6 6.5
- white international DOC wines (%) 0.8 0.4 6.2 7.8 14.2
- white international IGT wines (%) 2.2 3.3 18.0 5.2 8.5
- red international DOC wines (%) 6.0 1.9 12.1 20.5 33.0
- red international IGT wines (%) 24.6 10.0 34.5 12.8 9.0
- other IGT wines (%) 3.3 27.7 2.5 2.4 1.4
- other wines (%) 10.3 31.0 9.9 7.0 3.810
They are characterized by a favourable location on the hillsides, high prevalence of the pergola training
system, good presence of the traditional white grape varieties and wide participation in the DOC
p r o d u c t i o n  s y s t e m s .  L e s s  t h a n  o n e  t h i r d  o f  t h e  v i n e y a r d  s u r f a c e  w a s  r e n e w e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  t e n  y e a r s ,
allowing the introduction of new international grape varieties predominantly red. For this group, Small
and typical, the cooperative has not yet elaborated a development policy, although it could achieve more
specific differentiation strategies of the product portfolio. Currently, despite its peculiarities, it receives a
patronage return similar to Cluster 2. The production fragmentation and the socio-demographic and
cultural characteristics of this cluster may slow down the integration processes. However, the
improvement of the typical wines quality must start looking not only for economic incentives, but also for
cultural development, at least in the younger age classes.
Cluster 5 consists of a little more than a hundred members having the characteristics that make them able
to participate in quality initiatives. For this reason, they are the best rewarded by the current mechanism
of patronage return. They are young members with the biggest farms. The vineyards are well located on
hillsides and frequently renewed. The majority of the surface has been renewed in the last ten years, and
for more than half is trained by espalier systems. The planting density is similar to Cluster 3, and about
one third of the vineyard is mechanized. The most important characteristics of this cluster are: i)
enrolment in the DOC registers; ii) utilisation of organic cultivation methods; iii) focus on international
varieties; iv) the lowest yields. By virtue of the above-mentioned features, these members, called Coop
awareness, big and differentiated, have been easily included in planning activities by the cooperative and
contribute to deliver the grapes selected by the cooperative for the production of the higher range wines.
Probably, the experience acquired thanks to the specific relationship with these members could constitute
a framework for Clusters 3 and 4.
3.2. Analysis of patronage return mechanism and intervention hypothesis
A clear analysis of the diversification of the members’ strategic patterns has emerged by the segmentation
of the cooperative membership. Because of the evolution of the organisational and marketing strategies, it
is necessary to deeply analyse the patronage return mechanism and to implement some hypothesis about
how it is possible to depict the virtuous behaviour of the members.
For this reason, the third part of the research proposes to develop a patronage return model which
includes new elements for the evaluation of the quality of members’ deliveries.
The actual determination of patronage return is done by following the most widespread method used in
Italian cooperative wineries, based on the evaluation of a few parameters. In this case, the parameters are
five: delivered quantity, grape variety, sugar level, grape condition and designation for the production of
DOC or IGT wines. The parameters are objective and easily measured, but they can create opportunistic
behaviour by the members.
Cluster analysis showed that the grape patronage return mechanism tends to prize the large groups of
Opportunistic seniors and of Quantity focused, whose primary objective is to obtain the biggest profit per
hectare. Only the Coop awareness, big and differentiated members receive the highest patronage return
because of their adherence to quality initiatives. Indeed, the cooperative is trying to put into practice new
patronage return mechanisms for organic grapes, grapes delivered in plateaux and grapes that follow the
Quality Project, in order to prize the more aware grape growers in improving quality.
The production of organic grapes and high quality Garganega variety grapes delivered in plateaux to
produce “passito” wines is encouraged by a higher grape price. Nevertheless, few members participate in
these initiatives.
The Quality Project involves only the production of the Merlot, Cabernet Franc and Cabernet Sauvignon
varieties, responding a precise marketing project of the cooperative and aiming at inserting prestigious red
international wines in its product portfolio. For this reason, a production regulation has been foreseen,
whereby the members are obliged to farm the vineyard according to the indications of the technicians of
the cooperative. During the field visits, they must follow agronomical advice and they have to deliver all
the produced grapes in required ways. These farmers receive a patronage return which is proportional to
the growing area involved in the project
4. Nevertheless, the participants in the Quality Project are few.
4 If the grape production is less than 10 tonnes per hectare or the member doesn’t respect the cooperative technician’s
indications, the standard method is used.11
Therefore, when the patronage return is determined, the cooperative does not seem to completely take
into account the various characteristics of the members and the grapes. Some of these are considered only
in a marginal and indirect way, even if they may require more commitment in the agricultural practices
and higher fixed and variable costs. In consideration of this, the linear multiple regression model has been
applied.
The estimated model partially adheres to the reality (Table 6). This shows that the actual mechanism of
remuneration, which is based only on five parameters, does not comprehend the complexity of the
structural and managerial characteristics of the members.
Despite the expectations, the estimations show that the yield is the most important variable with a positive
coefficient for the explanation of the supply value per hectare. This factor goes against the quality, whose
pursuit should be supported by a supply value decoupled with the quantity produced.
The members who have a high planting density, renew their vineyards, are involved in quality initiatives,
or have vineyards enrolled in DOC registers, are less prized.
By examining the grape variety, negative coefficients for the share of white autochthonous, red
international and the “other grapes” emerge, because the market prizes white international wines, which
assume a marginal role in the supply of the cooperative. The supply of “other grapes” results less
penalized in the remuneration in respect to white autochthonous and red international grape varieties.
Table 6. Regression equation for the supply value per hectare – whole members population
Variable b s.e. b Sig. ε
Constant 5,149.591 234.002 0.000
Yield in grape 3.380 0.218 0.320 0.000 0.142
Share of vineyard on the hillside -5.086 1.185 -0.101 0.000 -0.026
Share  of  vineyard  enrolled  in  DOC  registers  7.371 1.155 0.140 0.000 0.052
Share of vineyard less than 10 years old 10.408 1.501 0.173 0.000 0.060
Planting density 0.244 0.042 0.125 0.000 0.057
Share of mechanizable vineyard -7.540 1.239 -0.134 0.000 -0.038
Share  of  white  autochthonous  grape  supply  -20.091 2.402 -0.300 0.000 -0.493
Share of red international grape supply -19.103 2.224 -0.299 0.000 -0.119
Share of “other grapes” supply -14.175 2.486 -0.201 0.000 -0.080
Participation in quality initiatives 1,388.402 207.841 0.145 0.000 0.015
F = 78.832, R = 0.556, R Square = 0.309, Adjusted R Square = 0.305
The regression shows the inverse proportionality between hillside production and supply value per
hectare, not considering the major vocation and the quality supplied.
The negative coefficient of the share of mechanized vineyard further shows that the cooperative is not
fully aware of the market aims in order to activate a differentiation mechanism inspired by a marketing
plan. An incentive to the mechanization would make the viticultural operations more efficient by
lowering costs. It will also permit the cooperative to have more control on the members and avoid very
high yields. Actually, the practice of mechanization is reserved for the largest vineyards situated on the
plain, that produce the lowest quality.
The analysis of the elasticity coefficients points out the positive role carried out by the yield in the
increasing of the supply value per hectare, and the negative one of the white autochthonous and red
international grape varieties.
T he  e x p la n ato ry  c ap ac ity  o f  the  mo d e l f o r e ac h o f  the  f iv e  g ro u p s  is  ind ic a te d  i n T ab le  7 . F o r t he
Opportunistic seniors and the Small and typical the model fits the reality. For the Warn out seniors and
the Quantity focused the errors are larger and have an opposite sign, evidencing the structural and cultural12
difficulties of the former and the orientation towards the short term period of the latter. Also the Coop
awareness, big and differentiated grape growers present an observed supply value that is larger than that
estimated, since they take advantage of the participation in the Quality Project.
These reflections confirm the hypothesis that the cooperative should follow diverse strategies for the
different typologies of grape growers, who are characterised by their own peculiarities, as highlighted by
the cluster analysis. This could arise through the thorough analysis of the differentiation portfolio
policies, the elaboration of specific development patterns for the different members’ typologies and the
assignation of more opportune incentives/penalties for everyone.
For this end, the application of the linear regression model to the clusters has been deemed useful. The
Coop awareness, big and differentiated has been excluded from the analysis because a large part of these
members are already involved in the closest form of integration with the cooperative. Taking into account
the characteristics of each cluster and the estimated model, specific strategic levers could be
individualized. The cooperative should focus on these levers in order to set up differentiated quality
projects based on the members’ potentiality to increase the efficiency between the supply quality and the
distributed benefits, and reduce opportunistic behaviours. At same time a new concept of the governance
would be activated, able to satisfy the expectations of more stakeholders.













Observed grape supply  value (€/ha)   3,530.98 4,847.90 6,066.49 4,862.90 6,727.08
Estimated  grape  supply  value  (€/ha)  3,931.27 4,892.68 5,651.47 4,786.11 6,473.67
Error term (€/ha) -400.29 -44.77 415.07 76.79 253.41
Incidence of error term on observed
grape supply value (%) 11.34 0.92 6.84 1.58 3.77
Table 8 shows the estimated elasticity coefficients for each cluster and the variables included in the
regression analysis. The results of the estimations and the significance index for the four regression
models are reported in detail in the Appendix.









Yield in grape 0.684 0.317 0.034 0.475
Share of vineyard on the hillside n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
Share of vineyard enrolled in DOC registers 0.018 n.i. 0.033 0.119
Share of vineyard less than 10 years old -0.011 n.i. n.i. 0.029
Planting density n.i. 0.053 n.i. n.i.
Share of mechanizable vineyard n.i. n.i. n.i. -0.020
Share of white autochthonous grape supply -0.218 -0.477 -0.887 -0.230
Share of red international grape supply n.i. n.i. -0.319 -0.092
Share of “other grapes” supply n.i. -0.552 n.i. n.i.
Participation in quality initiatives n.i. n.i. 0.004 0.010
n.i. = not included (the variable has been excluded from the model because not significant).13
The regression model applied to the Warn out seniors presents a good explanatory capacity with an
adjusted R square of 69% and puts in evidence a positive correlation between the grape supply value per
hectare and the yield, as well as the choice to enrol the vineyards in the DOC registers but with a lower
coefficient. Instead, the choice of vineyard renewal is penalized, even if with a very low elasticity
coefficient. The supply of white autochthonous grapes is not prized.
As regards the other variables not included in the model, the low planting density and the location on the
plain can not represent appraisable elements for this cluster. Instead, the mechanization suitability and the
role of red international grape varieties can be supported by incentives. Nevertheless, the small size of the
grape growers could make mechanization an inefficient choice, because it is an explicit cost against the
labour supplied by the entrepreneur and his family. Considering the role of red international grape
varieties, the cooperative must operate on two fronts: forward through marketing policies, backward
through a closer integration with these members both of a technical and cultural nature.
Also for the Opportunistic seniors the regression model, with an adjusted R square of 44%, shows that
the grape supply value is above all explained by the yield per hectare and the planting density of the
vineyard with the positive sign, but by the supply of the “other grapes” and white autochthonous grapes
with a negative sign. The variables excluded from the regression highlight the backwardness of these
members, given by the low propensity to investment, mechanization, enrolment in DOC registers and
participation in the cooperative, and by localization on the plain. It is clear that the cooperative can only
get low quality grapes from this cluster, even though in large quantity. At the moment, it would be
inconceivable to try to involve these members in quality initiatives. At the same time, it can not
discourage the high yield through an inverse correlation between it and the remuneration, because for the
principle of open membership the cooperative will risk to loose a critical amount of members, not
qualitatively relevant, but very productive. As it was verified for the Warn out seniors, the development
projects for these members are necessarily projected in the long term, favouring the renewal of the
investments, only if the intergenerational transfer will consent it. This will also allow the cooperative to
reach positive externality both from an economic and an environmental point of view.
The regression model applied to the Quantity focused has an adjusted R square of 29%, showing that the
patronage return for this cluster is barely explained by the selected variables. The results confirm that
these members have exhausted the potentiality supplied by the yield, which are the highest among the
groups. This cluster is also characterised by low awareness to the cooperative initiatives and to the DOC.
Even if this cluster is the most focalized on red international grape variety production, they do not
participate in the Quality Project. For this reason, the regression shows that this production is not prized,
like the autochthonous varieties. The elasticity coefficients highlight the sensitivity of the supply value to
the changes in these two variables. As it has been shown previously, socio-demographic characteristics
and innovation propensity will favour the involvement of these members in quality projects. However, the
cooperative should identify the mechanism able to decoupling the grape supply value from the quantity. It
should point out the mechanization possibility and the entrepreneurship elements, ensuring remuneration
stability in the mid-long term because of the probable lowering of quantity.
The regression model applied to the Small and typical shows an adjusted R square of 51%. Also for this
cluster, there is an high positive sensitivity of the supply value to the yield, and only marginally to the
enrolment in DOC registers and to the engagement in quality initiatives. Instead, the white autochthonous
and red international grape varieties are penalized, as well as, marginally, mechanization. The renewal of
the integration relationship between the cooperative and these members is not easy. Nevertheless, the
cooperative can not back out of this, because these members could supply the most interesting
contribution to typicality. The cooperative should encourage correct practices through incentives to the
DOC grape quality, the vineyard on the hillside and the investment propensity.
4. Conclusions
The research showed the problems of the Italian “grape growers - cooperative system”, but interesting
reacting factors are starting, such as the progressive renewal of the vineyards, also in order to apply a
rational mechanization, the variety differentiation and the localization in vocated areas. However,
intergenerational transfer is a critical point for the future of the business.
Through the factor analysis, five elements of differentiation have been discussed: Technological choices,
Size, Renewal of the vineyard, Viticultural vocation and Product portfolio. These factors have allowed the14
segmentation of the members. This practice could spread in other wine cooperatives also aiming at
increasing the governance ability and satisfying the stakeholders’ expectations.
The Coop awareness, big and differentiated members are already integrated with the strategic choices of
the cooperative and they have the highest supply value per hectare. Instead, the Warn out seniors and the
Opportunistic seniors can only be involved in long term intervention projects, if intergenerational transfer
is possible. In the short term, the cooperative should act towards the Quantity focused and the Small and
typical clusters, in order to initiate integration processes for the improvement of grape quality.
The large structural, strategic, social-demographic and cultural heterogeneity of the members (especially
in the big cooperatives, like this) suggests that a unique quality project for all the members is not
applicable. It is necessary to foresee different patterns in order to create diverse solutions in terms of
development projects both of the grape quality and the entrepreneurship, enforcing cultural, social and
territorial role of the cooperative. This process requires the commitment of the cooperative in market
research and in the individualization of the most opportune market segments. Product/channel/market
combinations and consequent different quality projects should be implemented.
The regression analysis highlighted some elements to privilege, which may generate management
implications. In particular, the actual cooperative strategic lines could become non-competitive. In fact, it
focuses on very crowded market segments poorly aware of the new trends, that lead competitors and
consumers to continually strive for the improvement in quality and for price policies. Furthermore, like
other Italian cooperatives, it continues to make alliances and takeovers. This can produce the
estrangement of the members from the cooperative top management in terms of coherence and
communication, putting into difficulties the “cooperative nexus”. The implementation of differentiation
for the diverse member typologies, as proposed in this research, would allow these risks to be face more
consciously.
The main development elements for the quality projects can be synthesized as follows: a) investment
renewal and grape variety choices can represent parameters of evaluation for the Warn out seniors, even
if this cluster needs a combination between cultural integration policies and analysis of market targets; b)
the renewal of investments will be important also for the Opportunistic seniors, even if it is difficult to
realize; the cultural development is also necessary in order to reach social objectives by the cooperative;
c) the decoupling of the remuneration from the production is inevitable for the Quantity focused and this
could be done through the evaluation of the investments and entrepreneurship; d) instead, typical
production, terroir vocation and investment propensity are the key elements to prize for the Small and
typical. The realization of the last two mentioned point can be favoured by the young age and the cultural
propensity to perceive the project initiatives.
In conclusion, in order to complete this research and make it a viable model to be applied to the
cooperative system, it would be necessary to examine at least three further aspects:
- the availability of information concerning social aspects, like the degree of participation in the
cooperative and the cultural level of the members;
- the quantification of the weight of new evaluation elements for the grape supply in order to formulate
new methods to determine the patronage return for the different typologies of members, maintaining
the actual remuneration margins in the short term;
- the analysis of the sociological and psychological characteristics of the members to favour the
acceptance and the correct application of the proposed model.
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Appendix
Table A1. Regression equation for the supply value per hectare – Warn out seniors
Variable b s.e. b Sig.
Constant 1,375.988 84.392 0.000
Yield in grape 14.179 0.433 0.859 0.000
Share of vineyard enrolled in DOC registers 4.133 0.957 0.109 0.000
Share of vineyard less than 10 years old -6.242 2.124 -0.075 0.003
Share of white autochthonous grape supply -4.469 0.906 -0.131 0.000
F = 279.928, R = 0.834, R Square = 0.695, Adjusted R Square = 0.693
Table A2. Regression equation for the supply value per hectare – Opportunistic seniors
Variable b s.e. b Sig.
Constant 5,614.805 374.403 0.000
Yield in grape 6.201 0.430 0.524 0.000
Planting density 0.299 0.079 0.136 0.000
Share of white autochthonous grape supply -18.511 4.630 -0.208 0.000
Share of “other grapes” supply -34.102 4.007 -0.440 0.000
F = 87.275, R = 0.663, R Square = 0.440, Adjusted R Square = 0.435
Table A3. Regression equation for the supply value per hectare – Quantity focused
Variable b s.e. b Sig.
Constant 7,959.667 248.475 0.000
Yield in grape 0.861 0.263 0.138 0.001
Share of vineyard enrolled in DOC registers 4.990 2.428 0.087 0.041
Share of white autochthonous grape supply -33.692 5.443 -0.289 0.000
Share of red international grape supply -39.444 3.304 -0.557 0.000
Participation in quality initiatives 2,850.873 1,087.527 0.111 0.009
F = 33.516, R = 0.544, R Square = 0.296, Adjusted R Square = 0.28717
Table A4. Regression equation for the supply value per hectare – Small and typical
Variable b s.e. b Sig.
Constant 2,825.712 308.194 0.000
Yield in grape 13.263 0.813 0.645 0.000
Share of vineyard enrolled in DOC registers 9.329 2.009 0.187 0.000
Share of vineyard less than 10 years old 5.330 2.643 0.091 0.045
Share of mechanizable vineyard -13.101 4.286 -0.131 0.002
Share of white autochthonous grape supply -12.271 3.145 -0.200 0.000
Share of red international grape supply -14.478 2.952 -0.245 0.000
Participation in quality initiatives 2,615.413 569.036 0.182 0.000
F = 48.482, R = 0.720, R Square = 0.518, Adjusted R Square = 0.507